Cybersecurity Economics – Balancing Operational Security Spending by Ekelund, Stale & Iskoujina, Zilia
  
Cybersecurity Economics – 
Balancing Operational Security 
Spending 
Ekelund, S. & Iskoujina, 
Author post-print (accepted) deposited by Coventry University’s Repository 
 
Original citation & hyperlink:  
Ekelund, S & Iskoujina, Z 2019, 'Cybersecurity Economics – Balancing Operational 
Security Spending' Information Technology & People, vol. 32, no. 5, pp. 1318-1342. 
https://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ITP-05-2018-0252 
 
DOI 10.1108/ITP-05-2018-0252 
ISSN 0959-3845 
 
Publisher: Emerald 
 
Copyright © and Moral Rights are retained by the author(s) and/ or other copyright 
owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge. This item cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively 
from without first obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder(s). The 
content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium 
without the formal permission of the copyright holders.  
 
This document is the author’s post-print version, incorporating any revisions agreed during 
the peer-review process. Some differences between the published version and this version 
may remain and you are advised to consult the published version if you wish to cite from 
it.  
 
     
Cybersecurity Economics – Balancing Operational Security Spending 
 
Abstract  
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how to find the optimal investment level in 
protecting an organisation’s assets. 
Design/methodology/approach – This study integrates a case study of an international financial or-
ganisation with various methods and theories in security economics and mathematics, such as value-
at-risk (VaR), Monte Carlo simulation, exponential and Poisson probability distributions. Thereby it 
combines theory and empirical findings to establish a new approach to determining optimal security 
investment levels. 
Findings – The results indicate that optimal security investment levels can be found through com-
puter simulation with historical incident data to find value at risk (VaR). By combining various sce-
narios, the convex graph of the risk cost function has been plotted, where the minimum of the graph 
represents the optimal invest level for an asset.	
Practical implications – The results can be used by leading business practitioners to assist them with 
decision making on investment to the increased protection of an asset. 
Originality/value – The originality of this research is in its new way of combining theories with his-
torical data to create methods to measure theoretical and empirical strength of a control (or set of con-
trols) and translating it to loss probabilities and loss sizes. 
Keywords – cyber security, security economics, security investment level, loss probability, control 
effectiveness measurement. 
Paper type – Research paper  
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1 Introduction  
Cybersecurity economics is an area concerned with whether an organisation is spending enough on 
securing their assets and whether the security budget is spent on the right things (Anderson and Schneier 
2004). While there has been a significant increase in research on cybersecurity economics (for example, 
Jacobs, Bulters and van Wieren, 2016; Buith, 2015; Choudhry and Wong, 2013; Brecht and Nowey, 
2012), the in-depth understanding of the security level, investments in security controls, and improve-
ments for new controls need to be examined further. 
Brecht and Nowey (2012) have categorised security spending by a proposed model for quanti-
fying security costs that they argue will increase accuracy, objectivity and comparability. Defence costs 
are what an organisation has chosen to invest to protect their assets. Gordon and Loeb (2006) claim that 
the benefits from cybersecurity investments come from cost-savings related to the avoidance of poten-
tial incidents; the outcome of the potential losses from incidents; the loss probability, and the loss re-
duction from an investment. A different approach has been presented by Lee et al. (2011) who identified 
which security investment levels are optimal in terms of balancing costs of protection and risks to an 
asset. They argue that the security level can be viewed as the strength or effectiveness of the controls 
applied to protect an asset (Lee et al., 2011). Therefore, it is vital to understand the marginal strength 
improvement of the security level, and how it translates to the reduced loss probability when investing 
in an additional security control. NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) (2008) pro-
vides a guide for performance measurement for information security, but fundamentally lacks a method 
for measuring effectiveness of a given security level. Peláez (2010) suggests an approach to measure 
how much a control decreases the loss probability and link risk to the effectiveness of control. While 
Peláez (2010) provides guidance on how to measure effectiveness using a quantitative technique, it 
lacks a clear linkage to determine loss probabilities and marginal improvements for new controls. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005) organised by Bank of International Set-
tlements (BIS) are the regulator of the well-known Basel regulatory framework for financial institutions. 
This framework includes risk measurement using value-at-risk (VaR) for capital preservation purposes 
to secure banking operations in difficult times, defining VaR as the sum of expected and unexpected 
losses. Also Jacobs et al. (2016) present an approach to determine future loss probability by using Cyber 
VaR, a risk quantification method for cyber risks adapted from the framework proposed by World Eco-
nomic Forum (2015). Cheung and Powell (2012) also examine how to calculate VaR using Monte Carlo 
simulation methods, where a stochastic process replaces the need to specify the probability distribution. 
Monte Carlo simulation is used in this study to determine VaR. 
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As seen, despite an increasing amount of research on cybersecurity economics, the question for 
cybersecurity practitioners as to how much to invest in protecting an organisation’s information assets 
remains. Therefore, the research objective for this study is to examine how an organisation can deter-
mine how much it is recommended to invest in the protection of a digital information asset. To reach 
this objective, this paper will address the following three research questions: (i) How can defence costs 
be determined, and losses calculated? (ii) How can the effectiveness of a security control be measured 
in terms of reduction in future loss probability? (iii) How can cybersecurity investment aimed at pro-
tecting an asset be optimised? The paper begins by briefly reviewing the literature on cybersecurity 
economics in such areas as security costs, loss probability, effectiveness of security controls and invest-
ment optimisation. These areas are discussed in order to develop research propositions that will be 
tested before the findings are presented.  
 
2 Theoretical background 
2.1 Costs of the cyber defence effort  
Investment in defence costs and security controls are aimed at protecting the assets of an organisation; 
when this fails, costs related to damages and losses are incurred (Wang et al, 2008). These two cost 
streams are explored to understand better how to categorise and quantify such costs. For example, 
Brecht and Nowey (2012) established a model for quantifying cyber security costs for increasing accu-
racy, objectivity and comparability. Their criterion for cost-benefit-calculation (Brecht and Nowey, 
2012) are as follows: a) costs for managing information security (in this research referred to as defence 
cost), b) costs related to information security measures (in this research referred to as defence cost), c) 
costs incurred by information security incidents (in this research referred to as losses), and d) cost of 
capital induced by information security risks (considered outside scope of this research). Subsequently, 
Brecht and Nowey (2012) suggest the ISMS-Layers approach to information security cost quantifica-
tion, which takes the perspective of information security management. According to ISO (n.d.), ISMS 
(Information Security Management System) is a risk management process involving people, processes 
and technology in protecting organisations’ assets. Brecht and Nowey (2012) discuss measurement, 
determinability (difficulty in security attribution) and information security cost ratio (percentage at-
tributed to security). 
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The ISMS-Layers approach appears adequate in determining information security costs. The 
security cost ratio, however appealing, is less helpful as one must anticipate substantial variations be-
tween organisations. Operational measures are assumed to be direct costs and the other layers to be 
indirect costs. Therefore, to assess the cost-benefit of an asset’s defence, further investigation on how 
defence costs can be determined, and losses calculated is needed. This will be examined in the Research 
Question 1: How can defence costs be determined, and losses calculated? The research question will be 
tested through the following propositions (Figure 1): 
Proposition 1a: Direct defence costs can be defined as any security cost that is exclusively aimed 
at protecting one or more, but not all, assets. 
Proposition 1b: Indirect defence costs can be defined as any security cost that is aimed at pro-
tecting all assets. 
Proposition 1c: Defence cost can be shared between some or all assets, or between security and 
non-security budgets. 
Proposition 1d: Cost of damages and losses caused by a cyber incident can be categorised in 
short and long-term losses. 
 
2.2 Determining effectiveness of a security control 
The purpose of measuring the effectiveness of security controls is to understand how a set of applied 
controls translate to a loss probability, and particularly the marginal improvement of adding one to a 
set of controls is already in operation. Ideally, improvements may be expressed in terms of impact of 
VaR. NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) (2008) and Peláez (2010) provide ap-
proaches but fail to link to loss probabilities and marginal improvements for new controls. Pagett and 
Ng (2010) argue that standards-based IT governance models such as COBIT, NIST and ISO27004 are 
more focused on ‘what’ needs to be measured rather than ‘how’. In response they propose an infor-
mation security effectiveness framework to address the ‘how’, with effectiveness measured based on 
characteristics of a control (Pagett and Ng, 2010). 
To measure effectiveness this way seems promising, but the proposal is leaning on what a des-
ignated policy prescribes, such as how many computers have antivirus installed. What if the policy is 
imperfect, but the characteristics otherwise score fully? This may lead an organisation to be lulled into 
a false sense of security. The method proposed increases understanding on how the effectiveness of a 
security control can be measured, but it does not link to a loss probability nor to VaR. By contrast, the 
approach presented by Huang et al. (2008) is more geared toward finding the optimal investment level 
where a security incident is associated with a probability function p that leads to losses. They further 
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claim that beyond some point of adding new controls, “the utility of the investment to the firm would 
actually be smaller than the expected utility from potential security breach” (Huang et al. 2008: 11). 
Moreover, Wang et al. (2008), Lee et al. (2011) and Huang et al. (2008) present solid mathematical 
models in deriving the expected value and VaR at a given security level, but the marginal effectiveness 
of adding a security control in terms of strength or effectiveness score is not covered. 
In summary, the research has identified several approaches attempting to express effectiveness 
of security controls. However, as they lack solid numerical representations, they are not particularly 
useful for this research. There may, however, be opportunities for syntheses between the approaches. It 
is therefore necessary to further explore how the effectiveness of a security control is measured and 
linked to loss probability. Therefore, Research Question 2 in this paper will address how the effective-
ness of a security control can be measured in terms of reduction in future loss probability. This research 
question will be tested through the following propositions (Figure 1): 
Proposition 2a: The reduction in loss probability is measurable and based on the characteristics of the 
security control, i.e. the effectiveness. 
Proposition 2b: The reduction measure is impacting VaR. 
 
2.3 Determining optimal security investments 
Faced with an opportunity to invest in more protection, it is beneficial to understand how to calculate 
the benefits from security investments and get guidance on how to find the optimal level to invest. 
Gordon and Loeb (2006) claim that cost-savings are an outcome of the potential losses from incidents, 
the loss probability and its reduction from an investment. They propose an approach to determine the 
optimal level of investment by a loss probability function with an investment level and a vulnerability 
level. Expected losses are given by the product of threat probability and monetary losses to an asset. 
The calculation may be conducted without historical attack data, that is, the investment level is the only 
decision variable. However, the vulnerability level and expected losses still need to be derived some-
how. By contrast, Huang et al. (2008) discuss the use of expected utility theory to identify the security 
investment level that maximises the utility of the investment. The framework presented is similar to the 
one Gordon and Loeb (2002) used but with different boundary conditions and assumptions. To compute 
the optimal investment, the probability of a security incident occurring in a given time frame, an invest-
ment level, a potential loss and a risk-aversion coefficient must be determined. This approach (Huang 
et al., 2008) applies classical economic theories to compute an optimal security investment to protect 
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an asset. As an input, historical data to determine the loss probability is needed, as well as a risk-aver-
sion coefficient. 
 The approaches reviewed are useful contributions in understanding the optimal amount to in-
vest in security. They are not, however, particularly beneficial on their own as they require input vari-
ables such as loss probabilities, vulnerability level and risk-aversion coefficients, which are not straight-
forward to determine. In effect, these approaches must be combined with supplemental methods to deal 
with the more demanding input variables. Therefore, Research Question 3 will examine how a cyber-
security investment aimed at protecting an asset can be optimised. This research question will be tested 
through the following proposition (Figure 1): 
Proposition 3a: The optimal investment level can be expressed as the minimum sum of defence 
costs and losses to an asset. 
2.4 Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework is a model consisting of the factors and their relationships that contribute to 
a problem and prepares for further discussions and investigation. It helps postulate and test certain re-
lationships in order to improve our understanding (Sekaran 2003). The theoretical framework in this 
case has been created from the hypotheses identified above: that the risk cost – the sum of defence costs 
and losses – has a minimum value that can be identified by adding or subtracting controls; increasing 
defence cost should proposedly reduce the losses (VaR), but it is also dependant on the effectiveness of 
the control invested in. The variables used in the framework are therefore one dependant variable, the 
risk cost, with underpinning independent variables. From the findings and interpretations of the litera-
ture review, the dependant variable has been identified as minimum risk cost as the measure of “how 
much to invest”. The dependent variable, key independent variables and their interconnections are il-
lustrated in  
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical framework 
Minimum risk 
cost
“how much”
Risk cost
(Prop. 3a)
Defence cost
(Prop. 1a-1d)
Loss (VaR)
(Prop. 2b)
Control effectiveness
(Prop. 2a)
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3 Research methodology  
This research is based on the scientific method, which is a systematic approach towards observing phe-
nomena, drawing conclusions and testing hypothesis (Sekaran 2003). Building and testing theories from 
a case study is a strategy that is used as a complementary method; developing theories and propositions 
from such empirical evidence is one of the best bridges from qualitative evidence to deductive research 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Kulmala et al (2006:147) deployed this approach arguing that “a sin-
gle case study was selected because initial understanding on the studied phenomenon was the target”; 
Shih et al (2017) based their research on a case study arguing its suitability for investigating contempo-
rary phenomena, which aligns well with the nature of this research. The general problem statement - 
how much an organisation should invest in protection - induces the need for researching existing 
knowledge in a set of multi-disciplinary topics. The identification of gaps in existing knowledge gen-
erate this study's research questions, which in turn generates the propositions. To answer each proposi-
tion, qualitative or quantitative research is conducted. The propositions are created in alignment to the 
theoretical framework, as illustrated in Figure 2. 
  
Figure 2. Research approach, derived from Sekaran (2003: 56) 
 
Preliminary literature 
review
Gaps in current 
knowledge
Research questions
(specific problems)
identifies
creates
Proposition 
1
Proposition
n
...
Theoretical framework
factors 
contributing to
General problem 
statement induces
Dependent 
variable 
Independent 
variable 1
Independent 
variable n...
influences
induces
aligned to
Data collection, analysis & interpretation
Qualitative or 
quantitative 
research
answered
through
All RQs
answered
?
no
yes
Empirical, secondary data
- Literature review
Case study, primary data
- Interview
- Archival records (stats)
Non-empirical, logic
- Calculations
- Simulations
Conclusion
 8 
The research questions are addressed using a case study with a mixed method. The qualitative 
approach serves as an input to a quantitative approach, which in turn will be used to acquire answers to 
the research questions. The data was collected through interviews and archival records.  The case study 
took place at an anonymised international financial services organisation referred to as ‘FinCorp Ltd.’, 
a substantial player in the European market and with offices around the world. During the course of 6 
weeks, three leaders from the information security department were interviewed, which in turn relayed 
many of questions to various subordinates for supporting information and provision of archival data. 
This department was chosen as it has overall responsibility for the protection of information assets. The 
interviews were conducted through plenary sessions. The participants were the CISO (Chief Infor-
mation Security Officer), the head of security architecture and the head of risk management. To set the 
stage, the first session was initiated by asking how security investments are justified today. Subse-
quently, questions were asked and discussed sequentially. The questions were sent a day in advance of 
the two sessions arranged. The objective of data analysis is to meet the research objective, and therefore 
the most important aspect of data evaluation is to convert the data collected into a format which will 
support adequate inference and decision-support (Sreejesh et al. 2014). Where appropriate, data is con-
verted into a numerical format appropriate for calculations and simulations. 
Computer-based simulation uses mathematical models to determine effects of change and has 
been used to study risk management in the finance area for some time (Sekaran 2003). Particularly 
when considering VaR, Monte Carlo simulation – an algorithm randomly simulating outcomes based 
on historical data – is the preferred method for data analysis for two reasons: to take advantage of any 
historical distribution of risk factors (Chourdry 2013), and to join a discrete distribution (loss arrivals) 
with a continuous one (loss sizes) (Navarrete 2006). The simulation starts with initial values for annual 
loss occurrence probability, and the loss sizes’ mean and standard deviation from the collected data. 
Then new arrival and size data are simulated by randomisation and joined to create new 12-months loss 
scenarios. The approach is illustrated in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Monte Carlo simulation model 
 
4 Data analysis, findings and discussion 
4.1 Proposition 1a. Direct defence costs can be defined as any security cost that is exclusively aimed 
at protecting one or more, but not all assets. 
Direct costs are costs directly associated with security controls protecting an asset; “if the asset is re-
moved, the controls and their associated costs are detachable”, as one interviewee put it. Furthermore, 
a security control may protect more than one asset (but not all) but still constitute direct costs. FinCorp 
Ltd. has deployed four security controls with the following annual operation costs to (directly) protect 
A𝜋: 
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   Table 1. Deployed security controls at FinCorp Ltd 
No Security control Estimated annual operation cost  
1 End-user with antivirus £ 0 
2 Application firewall £ 600,000 
3 Two-factor authentication £ 200,000 
4 Fraud detection module £ 300,000 
 
 
When considering the cost of cyber security, both defence cost and losses are considered as 
suggested by Brecht and Nowey (2012). As argued by Gordon and Loeb (2002) and Huang et al. (2008), 
the level of defence cost is related to the losses. It is therefore beneficial to cover these two cost cate-
gories in concept to monitor their interaction. Identifying what represent direct costs of protecting an 
asset is a matter of agreeing on what to include in such calculations. Based on the data collected from 
FinCorp Ltd., this research considers the direct defence cost as Operational Measures (as per the ISMS-
Layers approach in Figure 4), and the other categories as indirect costs. In general, the defence costs 
are represented as an annual cost that include an initial investment cost, an annual operating cost, and 
depreciation expenses due to a limited useful lifetime.  
 
  
Figure 4 - ISMS-Layers approach with ratios (Brecht and Nowey 2012, p.15) with adjustment 
Consider a set of security controls {n1, n2, …} protecting an asset Ai	∈ 𝒫.	Each control, denoted 
node, has a cost, c(n) > 0. Further, view this set of nodes as forming a risk vector, denoted v(Ai). The 
concept of a risk vector will be formally defined and discussed below, but for now it is sufficient to 
Management 
System
People and Processes
Architecture and Concepts
Operational Measures
Prerequisites
Security cost ratio
100%
80-85%
50%
100%
25%
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realise that each node has an individual cost and thus the cost of vector v(Ai), denoted c(𝜈(Ai)), is the 
cost of all nodes protecting it.  
4.2 Proposition 1b. Indirect defence costs can be defined as any security cost that is aimed at 
protecting all assets. 
Indirect costs are, as expressed during the interviews, “costs that are incurred by all employees with 
part or full-time responsibility for information security, security policies and guidelines, security aware-
ness and training, and the ISMS”. The estimated annual indirect costs of protecting all assets at FinCorp 
Ltd. including protect A𝜋, are categorised as follows:  
 
Table 2. Information security cost categories 
No Security cost category Estimated annual indirect cost  
1 Cost of operating the management system £ 1,000,000 
2 Cost of people and processes £ 2,000,000 
3 Cost of architecture and concepts £ 250,000 
4 Cost of prerequisites £ 500,000 
 
The obtained indirect cost data aligns well with the cost categories defined by Brecht and 
Nowey (2012). Let 𝛺	be the total annual information security cost of an organisation in protecting its 
portfolio of assets 𝒫	=	{A1, A2, …, Ak}. Also, let 𝜓 be the direct annual defence cost and 𝜔 the indirect 
annual cost, or expressed more formally: 
 
 𝛺	=	𝜔	+	𝜓	=	𝜔	+	c(𝜈(A1)) + c(𝜈(A2)) + … + c(𝜈(Ak))     (1) 	
Further assume 𝜓 = c(𝜈(A1)) + c(𝜈(A2)) + … + c(𝜈(Ak)), where 𝜓1 = c(𝜈(A1)), …, 𝜓k = c(𝜈(Ak)). 
In contrast to Brecht and Nowey (2012), 𝜓 is considered to be 100% dedicated to information security 
according to the definition of a risk vector, see 4.5. The formula for indirect costs 𝜔	 is exhibited in	
Figure 5: 
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The indirect annual cost 𝜔	23	of protecting	A𝜋 is exhibited in Figure 6: 
 
 
  Cost of Management System * 1   = £ 1,000,000 
 +  Cost of People and Process * 0.85  = £ 2,000,000 
 +  Cost of Architecture and Concepts * 0.5 = £    250,000 
 +  Cost of Prerequisites * 0.25   = £    500,000 
 =  Total indirect costs 𝜔	23   = £ 3,750,000 
Figure 6. Indirect cost of protecting A𝜋 
 
The obtained indirect cost 𝜔	23 is valid only if asset A𝜋 is the only asset. There are, however, 
more assets in FinCorp’s possession. It is therefore necessary to investigate how direct and indirect 
costs are shared (see the next Proposition 1c).  
4.3 Proposition 1c. Defence costs can be shared between some or all assets, or between security and 
non-security budgets 
The case study obtained information on several nodes including all that are used to protect asset A𝜋,	that 
is ni	∈ v(A𝜋). Table 5 in Section 4.5 displays the nodes and their annual operation costs. 
The total number of assets in FinCorp’s possession were not obtained from the case study but, 
using the asset as a service approach, the case study participants anticipated it to be less than 10. As per 
the case study, a node n can be protecting several assets. Therefore, the node cost c(n) should be divided 
between all the assets being protected by that node. This “reuse” of nodes is thus beneficial from a cost 
standpoint but may not be so from a protection standpoint as a defeated node may cause collateral 
damage. It is not, however, considered in the scope of this research to explore this potential weakness 
further.  
 
  Cost of Management System * 1 
 +  Cost of People and Process * 0.85 
 +  Cost of Architecture and Concepts * 0.5 
 +  Cost of Prerequisites * 0.25 
 =  𝜔 
Figure 5. Formula for indirect costs 
 13 
 
Let 𝑛5 ≥ 1 be the number of “reuses” a node k has in protecting assets in 𝒫. The direct annual 
cost 𝜓i = c(𝜈(Ai)) for protecting asset Ai	∈ 𝒫	is thus: 
 
 𝜓7 	= 	c(ν(𝐴7)) 	= 	 ;(<=)<= 	+ ⋯	+ 	 ;(<?)<? 		      (2) 
 
Also, when considering the indirect annual cost 𝜔, the cost may be equally divided between the 
assets in the portfolio 𝒫. For an asset Ai	∈ 𝒫 the indirect annual cost is: 
 
 𝜔i = @ABCDEF	GH	IJJEKJ	7<	𝒫        (3) 
 
At FinCorp Ltd. the direct annual costs of protecting A𝜋 are illustrated in Table 1. Applying 
these to (2), the direct defence cost of c(𝜈(A𝜋)) is obtained: 
 
 𝜓	23 = 	c(ν(𝐴L)) 	= 		 ;(<=)<= 	+ ;(<M)<M 	+ 	 ;(<N)<N 	+ 	 ;(<O)<O 	 = 
 = 		 PQ 	+ £SPP,PPPT 	+ 	 £UPP,PPPQ 	+ 	 £VPP,PPPQ 	= 	£	650,000	     (4) 
 
Further assume that FinCorp Ltd. has five assets in total, then the indirect cost 𝜔	23	is obtained	
through: 
 
 𝜔	23 	= 	 £	V,Z[P,PPP[ 	= 	£	750,000       (5) 
 
In summary, the total annual cost of protecting A𝜋 by applying (2) and (3) is: 
 
 Ω	23	=	𝜓	23 + 	𝜔	23 	= 	£	650,000 + 	£	750,000 = 	£	1,400,000 
 
Based on this, an annual level of defence cost has been calculated. For this level of defence, 
FinCorp Ltd. experienced losses of £ 491,825 over a period of 30 months (see the next Proposition 1d).  
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4.4 Proposition 1d. Cost of damages and losses caused by a cyber incident can be categorised in 
short and long-term losses. 
The Information Security Department at FinCorp Ltd. may or may not be representative in their re-
sponse to what is more important: short-term or long-term losses following a security incident. As the 
department is being measured on short-term data, this was considered most important. Loss observa-
tions, caused by 54 incidents, were provided for a period of 30 months. The losses incurred, £ 491,825 
in total, were short-term losses caused by cyber-attacks. 
Long-term losses, such as those arising from loss of competitive advantage, missing growth 
opportunities, and loss of customers themselves, were by contrast hard to determine within the time 
allocated by the study. They are therefore omitted from this research. It is, nevertheless, considered 
plausible to find persons and even whole departments that value long-term losses above short-term 
losses. The loss observations that took place in this study are what Jacobs et al. (2016) consider as 
operational continuity and payments; typical short-term losses affecting daily income and cash flow. 
These figures can be used for further calculations and simulations to investigate how defence costs and 
cost of losses are connected, and how future loss probability can be derived. To study this further, there 
is a need to construct a function denoted risk cost, which will take both the defence cost and the losses 
into account. 
Risk cost. The asset value of A𝜋 was estimated to £ 240,000,000. At the defence level 𝛺 = £ 
1,400,000, losses worth £ 491,825 were incurred, yielding a 12-month average of £ 196,730. Assume a 
new node is added aimed at protecting A𝜋 with some cost c(n) > 0. One would expect losses to be 
reduced by an amount x. However, adding another similar node with the same cost will reduce the losses 
by less than x, i.e. x – y1. And another similar node will thus reduce the losses by x – y2 where y2 < y1. 
This is in alignment with that the marginal improvement on security decreases with higher investments, 
where at some point “the utility of the investment to the firm would actually be smaller than the expected 
utility from potential security breach” (Huang et al. 2008: 11). This can be generalised through the 
following function: 
  
Risk cost = defence cost + losses        (6)  
 
According to the extreme value theorem (Renze and Weisstein n.d.) the risk cost function will 
have a maximum and minimum and create a U-shaped graph as illustrated in Figure 7. This is supported 
by Lee et al. (2011) claiming that the risk cost function is continuous and convex (u-shaped). Inspired 
by its shape, it is referred to as the U-graph of an asset. By construction, it follows that all assets have 
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a U-graph, i.e. a minimum risk cost exists for all assets. Thus, this graph is suitable to depict if an 
increased investment in defence is worthwhile.  
  
 
Figure 7. U-graph (risk cost function) of an asset 
 
Since risk is about a future event that may or may not occur, and the example above is referring 
to incurred losses, there is a need to be a little more specific. Three variants of risk cost can be identified 
as described in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Risk cost variants 
Risk cost variant Variables Formula Purpose 
Incurred Risk Cost Defence cost, 
Mean incurred losses  
IRC = 𝛺	+	L	 The actual risk costs, given 𝛺 
Expected Risk Cost Defence cost, 
Expected losses 
ERC = 𝛺	+	E[L] How the expected future 
risk costs will be, given 𝛺  
VaR Risk Cost Defence cost, 
VaR 
VRC = 𝛺	+	VaR What the maximum future 
risk costs with a given con-
fidence level will be, given 𝛺 
 
Risk	cost
Defence	cost
a bAfter	applying
the	ith security
control
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VaR calculation for determining future loss. To collect data for the U-graph of A𝜋, it is necessary 
to calculate future losses in terms of expected loss and VaR. It is also necessary to find a way to deter-
mine the effectiveness of the security controls and translate them into quantitative values and explore 
how this will affect the loss probabilities. As suggested by the World Economic Forum (2015), Jacobs 
et al. (2016), Wang et al. (2008), Lee et al. (2011) and Huang et al. (2008), VaR can be applied for 
determining future losses. Based on the data obtained from FinCorp Ltd. VaR can be calculated for the 
online services asset A𝜋 employing a Monte Carlo simulation in R. Initially, it is assumed that no his-
torical data exist. The simulation follows the steps described in Figure 3, and the code for the compu-
tation is shown in Figure 8, where each step is followed by a description.  
 
 
Figure 8. VaR calculations with Monte Carlo simulation 
 
Subsequent simulations take advantage of the actual historical distribution for the risk factor rather than 
assuming a pre-determined normal distribution (see 4.6). Many simulations are run, each yielding dif-
ferent results. In the end, the simulation will aggregate to a more realistic result (Choudhry 2013).  By 
using the mean (µ) and standard deviation (𝜎) derived from the loss observations, the 5% VaR loss 
value is obtained: VaR = £ 82,706 per month. This indicates that there is a 5% probability of losing 
more than £ 82,706 in the next month as a result of cyber incidents, or £ 286,504 over the next 12 
months. The expected value of a normal distribution is its mean value (Hildebrand n.d.), thus: 
 
 E[L] = µ = | – 0.0068% · £ 240,000,000 | = £ 16,320 per month 
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Thus, FinCorp Ltd. can expect to lose on average £ 16,320 per month or £ 195,840 per year, by 
construction approximately the same as the average losses incurred. Applying these numbers to the risk 
cost variants yields:  
 
Table 4. Risk cost calculations 1 
Risk cost variant Calculation 
IRC  = £ 1,400,000 + £ 196,730 = £ 1,596,730 
ERC  = £ 1,400,000 + £ 195,840 = £ 1,595,840 
VRC  = £ 1,400,000 + £ 286,504 = £ 1,686,504 
 
4.5 Proposition 2.a. The reduction in loss probability is measurable and based on the characteristics 
of a security control, i.e. the effectiveness. 
One of the key points in this research is to demonstrate how to depict the U-graph for an asset. This will 
be shown by using A𝜋 as an example. Consequently, a method to determine the effectiveness of a node, 
both alone and in union with a set of existing ones, is needed. As the literature review did not increase 
our understanding as to how to determine such effectiveness, this research demonstrates a possible ap-
proach. 
Inspired by the attack-defence process articulated by Jacobs et al. (2016), and paths of attacks 
(aka attack vectors), a simple framework for visualising and exploring the effectiveness of nodes can 
be created, referred to as a risk vector. This research assumes the term risk vector for the pathway where 
incidents leading to malicious exploitation may occur with potential to cause losses. It is correspond-
ingly along this pathway where security controls are applied, and their effect can be measured, e.g. 
reduction in loss amounts. To illustrate how the malicious exploitation of an asset occurs, consider the 
cyber kill chain (Lockheed, n.d.) depicted in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9. Cyber kill chain (Lockheed, n.d.) 
Signs of a security incident are considered as either precursors or indicators, where the former 
is a sign that an incident may occur in the future and the latter is a sign that an incident is ongoing or 
has already occurred (NIST 2012). The prime interest is in the precursors and indicators appearing along 
the vector. A complementary view is the attack-defence process, describing attack flow and an organi-
sation’s cyber defence capability (Jacobs et al 2016) as illustrated in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10. Attack-defence process (Jacobs et al 2016, p.150) 
The relation between the two views is shown in Figure 11, offering an illustration of a risk 
vector. 
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Figure 11. Relation between the cyber kill chain (Lockheed, n.d.) and the attack-defence process (Jacobs et 
al 2016, p.150) 
In a vector v = v(A), consider a node n ∈	𝜈 with a strength, 𝜌(n) > 0 which is derived from a 
score, s(n) ≥ 0, according to the control effectiveness scoring scheme discussed below. Thus, 𝜈(A) will 
have a cumulative cost denoted c(𝜈(A)) or simply c(𝜈) if it is clear which asset it pertains to. Likewise, 𝜈(A) will have a cumulative strength denoted 𝜌(𝜈(A)) or simply 𝜌(𝜈). The strength will be a measure on 
how much all nodes will reduce the risk of loss to an asset A. The following risk vector 𝜈(A𝜋) was 
observed at FinCorp Ltd:	
 
 
Figure 12. Risk vector 𝜈(A𝜋) at FinCorp 
where the nodes identified are: 
 
Table 5. Nodes protecting A𝜋 
Node Security control Estimated annual operation cost  
n1 End-user with antivirus £ 0 
n2 Application firewall £ 600,000 
n3 Two-factor authentication £ 200,000 
n4 Fraud detection module £ 300,000 
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Through the construct of the risk vector, a framework for measurement and modelling of risk 
has been established. The literature review did not, however, identify any complete method of measur-
ing a security control’s effectiveness alone or in concert with other controls in protecting an asset, and 
even less so linking effectiveness to loss probabilities. Nevertheless, Pagett and Ng (2010) argue that 
the effectiveness is linked to the characteristics of a control. Thus, a purpose-built approach is needed.  
Control effectiveness and strength. A security control instantiates a mitigation treatment strategy such 
as deterrence, prevention, detection or recovery, aiming to reduce the likelihood and/or impact of a risk 
(Straub and Welke 1998). Peláez (2010) argues that ISO/IEC 27004 provides guidance for measuring 
the effectiveness, not only the of controls themselves, but also management and implementation pro-
cesses, commonly referred to as the Information Security Management System (ISMS). Based on this, 
consider the nature of the control (type), its mean of functioning (prescription), its susceptibility to 
being defeated (fallibility) and its ability to adapt to new threats (agility) as characteristics that impact 
its effectiveness. It is thus possible to assess a control’s effectiveness against its capability in deterrence, 
prevention, detection and recovery. Assessing these factors may also implicitly measure the effective-
ness of the treatment strategy. Figure 13 illustrates the scoring scheme: 
 
  
Figure 13. Control effectiveness scoring scheme 
 
By rating the control against these characteristics an effectiveness score s can be determined. For 
each characteristic, a score of 4 is strongest and 1 is weakest. A characteristic that is not applicable is 
scored as 0. That gives a possible scoring range 0 ≤ s ≤ 16 for each control, and the sum of effectiveness 
scores of all controls in the risk vector	𝜈(A) is simply: 
 
 S = S(𝜈(A)) = ∑ si S ≥ 0,  i = 0, 1, 2, …      (7) 
                          Score
Characteristic 1 2 3 4
Type Administrative Administrative/techncal
Technical/
administrative Technical
Prescription Logging only/observation
Rules/signature/
heuristics
Live threat 
intelligence Machine learning
Fallibility Likely Possible Unlikely Impossible
Agility Reprogramming Re-configuration Run-time Self-learning
 21 
 
Applying the scoring scheme to the nodes in v(A𝜋) is illustrated in Figure 14, and the selected 
rating marked with green. The result of applying (9) to these scorings is S = 9 + 11 + 9 + 11 = 40. 
  
n1. End-user with AV. Score: 9 n2. Application firewall. Score: 11 
   
n3. Two-factor authentication. Score: 9 n4. Fraud detection module. Score: 11 
  
Figure 14. Control scoring of nodes in v(A𝜋) 
 
Adding a security control to protect an asset reduces the risk of that asset. The key question is 
how much and how this relates to S. To answer this, another heuristic method will be applied assuming 
that the marginal improvement on security decreases with additional controls (Huang et al 2008). As an 
introduction, one can use intuition to depict a reasonable trajectory that resonates with probability, i.e. 
taking on values in the interval [0, 1].  
To depict this trajectory in accordance with the security level as proposed by Lee et al. (2011), 
and in such a way that it can be linked to probability, consider the exponential probability distribution 
with a scale parameter 𝜏	(Taboga 2010):  
  
 f(x) = e-𝜏x	 	 x ∈ [0, ∞)       (8) 
 
and particularly the cumulative density function:  
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 F(x) = 1 – e-𝜏x	 	 x ∈ [0, ∞)       (9)	
 
This function will always generate a value in the interval from [0, 1]. By substituting x with the 
control effectiveness score S, and applying it to (9), the following is achieved: 
 
 F(S) = 1 – e-𝜏S	 	 S ∈ [0, ∞)       (10) 
  
By assigning an appropriate initial value to the scale parameter 𝜏, the control effectiveness score to 
strength conversion function is finalised. For example, let: 
 
 𝜏	=	0.05	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (11)		
This results in the following trajectory: 
 
 
Figure 15. Control effectiveness score 
 
This trajectory aligns well with the decreasing marginal effect and should serve the purpose for 
converting the security control effectiveness score to a strength metric 𝜌. This research thus defines 
strength of vector 𝜈 as: 
 
 F(S) = 𝜌(𝜈) = 1 – e-𝜏S	 	 S ∈ [0, ∞)      (12) 
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Table 6 presents some calculations applying (11) with (12) including the effectiveness scoring of 
v(A𝜋):  
 
Table 6. Samples of conversion between effectiveness and strength scores 
S 𝜌(𝜈) 
0 0 
10 0,39 
20 0,63 
30 0,78 
40 𝜌(𝜈(A𝜋)) = 0,86 
50 0,92 
100 0,99 
  
The next step is to establish a link between strength 𝜌(𝜈) and a desirable risk metric of 𝜈(A): the 
probability for a loss occurrence on asset A along risk vector 𝜈(A), referred to as loss probability. 
Marchini (2008) argues that a Poisson distribution is a discrete probability distribution for the counts 
of events that occur randomly in a given time interval; a counting process. Consider the discrete random 
variable X representing losses occurring through 𝜈(A); the arrival of these occurrences can be viewed 
as a counting process as each arrival is independent of each other, and thus has a Poisson distribution. 
If 𝜆 is the mean number of observed loss occurrences per day, then the probability of observing x events 
on a given day is determined by the following distribution function (Mikosch 2009): 
 
 p(X = x) = e-n nop!    x = 0, 1, 2, 3, …     (13) 
 
It follows that the cumulative distribution function is given by: 
 
 F(X = x) = 	e-n nrs!pstP         (14) 
 
By the law of large numbers, if one has N(t) events occurring during time t, 𝜆 is determined 
through (Mikosch 2009): 
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 λ	=	 N(t)t           (15) 
 
The positive real number 𝜆 also happens to be equal to the expected value of X and its variance 
(Mikosch 2009):  
 𝜆	 =	E[X] = Var[X]         (16) 
 
FinCorp Ltd. endured 54 loss occurrences over a 30-month period, a mean of 1.8 losses per 
month, i.e.  
 𝜆m	= 1.8  loss probability, per month     (17) 
 
which by (16) is also the expected value going forward. Then the following cumulative proba-
bility function is obtained: 	
 
Figure 16. Cumulative Poisson distribution for loss occurrences at FinCorp Ltd. 
 
The trajectory of a cumulative Poisson distribution function resembles that of the cumulative 
exponential probability distribution; this neighbouring similarity will be used to approximate a link 
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between the strength and the mean loss probability 𝜆. From (17) 𝜆m	= 1.8 for a month was found, thus 
a one-day (1/30 of a month) time horizon yields: 
 𝜆d = 0.06 loss probability, per day      (18)
   
By design, the closer to 1 the strength	𝜌(𝜈) moves, the closer to 0 the loss probability moves. 
The following construct articulates exactly this point, where	𝜀	is some error adjustment factor: 		 𝜆d	=	1 – 𝜌(𝜈)·𝜀	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (19)	
 Recall from (12) that 𝜌(𝜈) = 1 – e-𝜏S.	As an adjustment factor is already in place, the scale pa-
rameter 𝜏, one can simply combine (12) and (19): 
 𝜆d	= e-𝜏S	 	         (20) 
 
If the effectiveness score of a risk vector and the scale parameter 𝜏	are determined, these pro-
duce an estimator for the mean number of loss occurrences. Conversely, once historical data has been 
collected, the mean 𝜆d can be easily computed and the scale parameter 𝜏	assigned an appropriate value. 
By rearranging (20) the following is obtained: 	 𝜏 = – {|(n})~           (21) 
 
This finalises the heuristic model for the relationship between the strength 𝜌(𝜈) and the mean 
loss probability 𝜆d.	 For risk cost calculations, an adjustment of the calculations based on the new	scale 
parameter 𝜏	is needed. Then one must select a new prospective node, and run new calculations to de-
termine the new losses.  Consider an expansion of Table 6 with the new knowledge obtained from (18) 
and (21) to derive the new 𝜏. In addition, the values for the scenarios of adding and subtracting up to 
two nodes are calculated. From Figure 14, an average effectiveness score of s = 10 is inferred. The new 
calculations are derived from the current situation as highlighted in green, i.e. with 𝜆d	= 0.06:  		
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Table 7. Adjustment calculations 
  Initial calculation, 𝜏	=	0.05 New calculation, 𝜏	=	0.07 
 S 𝜌(𝜈) = 1 – e-𝜏S 𝜆d	=	1 – 𝜌(𝜈) 𝜌(𝜈) = 1 – e-𝜏S 𝜆d	=	1 – 𝜌(𝜈) 
- 2 nodes 20 0.63 0.37 0.76 0.24 
- 1 node 30 0.78 0.22 0.88 0.12 
Current 40 0.86 0.14 0.94 0.06 
+ 1 node 50 0.92 0.08 0.97 0.03 
+ 2 nodes 60 0.99 0.05 0.99 0.01 
 
4.6 Proposition 2b. The reduction measure is impacting VaR. 
No quantitative data was collected for this Proposition, but the discussion below elaborates logically on 
the knowledge created so far. To obtain the relevant points in the U-graph of A𝜋, Monte Carlo simula-
tions must be run to compute the numbers. This is supported by Cheung and Powell (2012) claiming 
that the stochastic process of the Monte Carlo method replaces the need to specify the probability dis-
tribution. This research assumes that adding a node reduces the loss probability, and conversely, sub-
tracting a node increases it (as per Table 7). Since only the loss probabilities at various levels of protec-
tion are known, this must be translated to loss sizes. Recall from (4) that the direct costs of protecting 
A𝜋 come from four nodes. Consider the two-factor authentication and fraud detection module incurring 
a cost of £200,000 and £300,000 respectively. These nodes will be used for estimating Ω	23  at various 
levels. The following steps are executed to obtain graph values:  
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Table 8. Process for obtaining values for U-graph 
Step Activity 
1 Start with the current strength S = 40, which gives an annual mean 𝜆*	=	𝜆d	·	365	= 21.9 to 
be used as input to the Monte Carlo simulation together with the mean and standard devia-
tion for the normal distributed VaR calculation, µ = -0.0068 % and 𝜎 = 0.0168 %. The 
simulation will generate 1000 simulated values for: 
- Annual loss probability 𝜆* 
- 5% VaR loss for as percentage and value 
- Expected loss E[L] as value 
2 Compute mean values of 𝜆*, VaR and E[L]. Verify that mean 𝜆*	is	approximately the same 
as entered in step 1. For S = 40, also verify that the mean VaR ≈ £ 286,504 and  
E[L] ≈ £ 195,840 (from 0) to ensure the simulation is reliable 
3 Compute the defence cost. For S = 40, it is £ 1,400,000. For the other levels of S, use the 
cost £200,000 for the first node (both adding and subtracting), and £300,000 for the second 
node. Note: For simplicity, the indirect cost is assumed to be fixed although in reality it will 
vary somewhat with adding/subtracting controls 
4 Compute VaR Risk Cost and Expected Risk Cost for S = 20, 30, 40, 50 and 60 
 
The result from the simulation is illustrated in Figure 17, which incidentally shows that the risk 
reduction impacts VaR and therefore verifies this Proposition. An extract of the simulation results is 
presented in Appendix A. 
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Figure 17. U-graph for A𝜋	
 
The risk reduction is impacting VaR as demonstrated in the calculations. The immediate inter-
pretation of the U-graph is that FinCorp Ltd. does not currently need to invest more in security as the 
risk cost would increase; there are presently no better investment choices, and the research has thereby 
also found the financially optimal investment level.  
4.7 Proposition 3a. The optimal investment level can be expressed as the minimum risk cost (sum of 
defence costs and losses) to an asset. 
Previously it was argued that the convex risk cost function exists for all assets and will form a U-graph. 
It is also shown that the minimum of this function will correspond to the financially optimal defence 
level for an asset, as demonstrated above. The approach resembles the model developed by Gordon and 
Loeb (2006) but expands it by using the U-graph as historical data is used to determine loss probability 
rather than just assuming it. Gordon and Loeb (2002) and Huang et al. (2008) present approaches that 
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identify the budget, but the strength must also be determined. By applying the approach from this re-
search, a control having a cost within budget and a strength that reaps the most benefit can be identified. 
Combining models like those developed by Gordon and Loeb (2002) and Huang et al. (2008) with 
approaches described in this research would therefore reinforce each other in order to verify this.  
 
5 Discussion  
This research articulates an easily deployable approach to convey an organisation’s risk posture in a 
continuous manner to top management. Through its scientific basis, it should therefore be considered 
more reliable as a decision-support tool than the prevalent “fear, uncertainty, and doubt (FUD) strategy” 
(Brecht and Nowey 2012: 2) used to sell investments in cybersecurity. This study has employed a com-
bination of qualitative and quantitative techniques to expand the understanding of this topic. 
Propositions 1a to 1d demonstrated how defence costs can be determined and categorised as 
direct and indirect. Defence costs can also be shared and categorised according to the ISMS-Layers 
approach (Brecht and Nowey, 2012) to prepare for a more realistic cost picture. Cost of damages and 
losses can be divided into short-term and long-term to prepare for loss calculations. The research has 
thus shown how cost of damages and losses can be categorised and by knowing both the defence cost 
and the correlated losses, the risk cost of an asset is determined. The risk cost function will for all assets 
be convex and form a U-graph. The findings and logical reasoning support existing knowledge. This 
answers Research Question 1: How can defence costs be determined, and losses calculated? 
The risk vector framework was established to aid in visualising and exploring the effectiveness 
of security controls. Through the control effectiveness scoring scheme, the characteristics of a security 
control is quantified a correlated to loss probability for an asset. By applying the collected data to the 
proposed Monte Carlo simulation, it is demonstrated how the adding (or subtracting) of a security con-
trol to the risk vector impacts VaR and will generate a U-graph. The research has shown how the loss 
probability of an asset can be measured by the characteristics of the security controls protecting it. The 
findings and logical reasoning are connecting existing knowledge from different areas, creating a syn-
thesis that expands the knowledge obtained from the literature review. This answers Research Question 
2: How can the effectiveness of a security control be measured in terms of reduction in future loss 
probability? 
The use of Monte Carlo simulation to generate U-graphs can be used as a generic method to 
identify the minimum of the U-graph by adding or subtracting security controls until it is located. As 
both defence costs and future losses are considered, this minimum will correspond to the financially 
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optimal defence level for an asset. Conclusively, the logical reasoning is connecting existing knowledge 
from different areas, creating a synthesis that expands the knowledge obtained from existing literature. 
This answers Research Question 3: How a cybersecurity investment can be aimed at protecting an asset 
be optimised? 
To summarise, this research has demonstrated how to categorise information security costs; 
direct and indirect defence costs and losses. Direct costs can be identified through their dependency on 
one or more, but not all, assets. Otherwise, defence cost is regarded as indirect. It is also found that 
defence costs can be shared. For direct costs, this can be done between assets that are collectively being 
protected by a control, whereas indirect costs can be evenly distributed between all assets. By knowing 
both the defence cost and correlated losses, the risk cost of an asset is determined. The risk cost function 
will for all assets be convex and form a U-graph. The minimum of this function will correspond to the 
financially optimal defence level for an asset, obtained through calculating VaR for various scenarios. 
It has further been shown how loss probabilities of an asset can be measured through the controls’ 
characteristics, linked to a strength score and adjusted by actual data. The risk amendment following 
the addition or subtraction of new controls in the risk vector is impacting VaR, which is demonstrated 
in the calculations and the U-graph. Finally, this research has shown that an organisation can balance 
its operational security spending by using the U-graph, so it supports the business leadership in making 
informed decisions on whether the defence spending is enough, too much or too little in protecting 
assets.  
 
6 Conclusion  
The research has verified and demonstrated how organisations can determine the optimal investment 
level in protecting assets, and the case study has been used as a verification of the theories articulated. 
By means of a multi-disciplinary scientific approach, the paper provides guidance to leading business 
practitioners to assist them with decision-making on cyber security. The approach can be integrated 
with existing risk management practices and strengthen business-case discussions and cyber security 
related communication with top management. By the adoption of this approach, an organisation can 
balance its operational security spending.  
The limitations of the research include a modest number of loss observations from one case 
study, and the use of normal probability distribution. These areas should undergo further research in-
cluding larger data set of losses and exploring other probability distributions. Furthermore, the approach 
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has limitations where there are no historical data available or the data has zero losses. Future research 
should therefore investigate how to integrate very low probability events with devastating impact. 
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8 Appendix A 
Result tables from Monte Carlo simulation 
 
1000 runs were conducted, and the mean numbers are calculated based on this. For brevity, only the 
first 10 rows are displayed. 
 
Run Lambda(y) VaR	month VaR	month	% VaR	year VaR	year	% E[L] #	simulation	runs 1000
0 91,42 261600 -0,109 907200 -0,378 686058 Mean	! 89,32
1 87,42 230400 -0,096 799200 -0,333 647596 Mean	VaR	month 238848
2 89,42 240000 -0,1 830400 -0,346 674565 Mean	VaR	month	% -0,0995
3 91,92 249600 -0,104 864000 -0,36 659558 Mean	VaR	year 827256
4 83,08 225600 -0,094 782400 -0,326 608591 Mean	VaR	year	% -0,3447
5 87,92 232800 -0,097 806400 -0,336 645161 E[L] 658380
6 88 235200 -0,098 813600 -0,339 653118
7 88,25 240000 -0,1 830400 -0,346 653918
8 90,83 249600 -0,104 864000 -0,36 670633
9 89,75 242400 -0,101 840000 -0,35 664841
10 86,08 223200 -0,093 772800 -0,322 636782
Run Lambda(y) VaR	month VaR	month	% VaR	year VaR	year	% E[L] #	simulation	runs 1000
0 46,25 141600 -0,059 489600 -0,204 331424 Mean	! 43,74
1 43,67 129600 -0,054 448800 -0,187 332090 Mean	VaR	month 127296
2 45,75 132000 -0,055 458400 -0,191 323079 Mean	VaR	month	% -0,0530
3 42 124800 -0,052 432000 -0,18 314727 Mean	VaR	year 441192
4 45,17 129600 -0,054 448800 -0,187 334286 Mean	VaR	year	% -0,1838
5 45,42 132000 -0,055 458400 -0,191 324656 E[L] 324097
6 44,17 129600 -0,054 448800 -0,187 345787
7 43,5 124800 -0,052 432000 -0,18 342080
8 45,75 129600 -0,054 448800 -0,187 344152
9 40,83 120000 -0,05 415200 -0,173 308502
10 43,67 122400 -0,051 424800 -0,177 314700
Run Lambda(y) VaR	month VaR	month	% VaR	year VaR	year	% E[L] #	simulation	runs 1000
0 22,67 72000 -0,03 249600 -0,104 156737 Mean	! 21,87
1 22 69600 -0,029 240000 -0,1 143268 Mean	VaR	month 70680
2 21,75 64800 -0,027 225600 -0,094 177715 Mean	VaR	month	% -0,0295
3 19,92 64800 -0,027 225600 -0,094 157021 Mean	VaR	year 244464
4 24,58 76800 -0,032 266400 -0,111 171338 Mean	VaR	year	% -0,1019
5 20,75 64800 -0,027 225600 -0,094 164337 E[L] 163460
6 23,33 74400 -0,031 256800 -0,107 160603
7 21,92 72000 -0,03 249600 -0,104 153439
8 18,67 62400 -0,026 216000 -0,09 176444
9 17,75 57600 -0,024 199200 -0,083 162013
10 22,67 76800 -0,032 266400 -0,111 168629
Run Lambda(y) VaR	month VaR	month	% VaR	year VaR	year	% E[L] #	simulation	runs 1000
0 12,67 60000 -0,025 208800 -0,087 77173 Mean	! 10,98
1 10,85 40800 -0,017 141600 -0,059 72171 Mean	VaR	month 42984
2 10,52 45600 -0,019 158400 -0,066 79716 Mean	VaR	month	% -0,01791
3 11,83 50400 -0,021 175200 -0,073 67200 Mean	VaR	year 148992
4 11,35 43200 -0,018 148800 -0,062 79990 Mean	VaR	year	% -0,06208
5 10,33 45600 -0,019 158400 -0,066 81538 E[L] 80902
6 10,93 45600 -0,019 158400 -0,066 81199
7 10,59 40800 -0,017 141600 -0,059 84569
8 11,43 45600 -0,019 158400 -0,066 74118
9 11,01 40800 -0,017 141600 -0,059 81237
10 12,16 50400 -0,021 175200 -0,073 85279
Run Lambda(y) VaR	month VaR	month	% VaR	year VaR	year	% E[L] #	simulation	runs 1000
0 3 14400 -0,006 50400 -0,021 26750 Mean	! 3,59
1 3,42 16800 -0,007 57600 -0,024 22156 Mean	VaR	month 17400
2 3,58 16800 -0,007 57600 -0,024 27619 Mean	VaR	month	% -0,00725
3 3,33 16800 -0,007 57600 -0,024 22984 Mean	VaR	year 60240
4 3,5 16800 -0,007 57600 -0,024 12457 Mean	VaR	year	% -0,0251
5 3,5 16800 -0,007 57600 -0,024 31243 E[L] 27192
6 3,08 16800 -0,007 57600 -0,024 29150
7 2,58 12000 -0,005 40800 -0,017 27422
8 3,67 19200 -0,008 67200 -0,028 23095
9 4,42 19200 -0,008 67200 -0,028 28769
10 3,33 14400 -0,006 50400 -0,021 17740
!	=	0.24	/	-2	nodes
!	=	0.12	/	-1	node
!	=	0.06	/	current
!	=	0.03	/	+1	node
!	=	0.01	/	+2	nodes
